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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintif£-Respondent,

Case No.
9971

vs.

'

JEAN SINCLAIR,
Defendant-Appellant.

.J

APPELLANT'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT
OF PETITION FOR REHEARING

POINT I
THE COURT HAS MADE UNSUPPORTED CONCLUSIONS NOT BASED IN ANY WAY ON THE
EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD OR LOGICAL INFERENCES THEREFROM UPON WHICH THE DECISION
WAS BASED, CREATING THE INESCAPABLE CONCLUSION THAT THE OPINION WAS NOT BASED
UPON THE RECORD BY WHICH THE COURT IS
BOUND.
A careful review of the entire record, both
briefs, and the decision of the Court reveals the following discrepancies:
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(a) Paragraph 5 of the Court's decision states:
"In searching for a solution to this crime the
police learned from LaRae Peterson that the defendant Jean Sinclair had manifest a violent animus
toward Foster and had made threats upon his life."

There is no evidence to this effect in the record
nor any claim of such evidence in the State's brief.
It is interesting to note that such language does appear in a publication of "Master Detective Magazine"
for July of 1963 which was distributed in the Salt
Lake area during the hearing of the trial in April,
1963.
(b) In paragraph 2, page 2, of the opinion, the
Court states:
"She was dressed in gray men's pants, had on boots,
and had a tan trench coat wrapped around the gun."

This statement is directly from the State's brief, page
1L and is a misquotation of the record. Kuehne's
testimony being at R. 579;
"She went out to the car and got what I later learned
was a white trench coat, came back and wrapped the
.-.-,,gun 1n 1t.

Again at R. 584, line 12:
"a blue parka under a white trench coat"

both statements by the State's witnesses on the
State's examination.
(c) In the first paragraph of page 3, the Court
sets out as a corroborative circumstance
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''She was seen driving around in a car with him
(Kuehne) (to pick a point of vantage to kill
Foster)."

There is no such testimony in the record. No witness claims to have seen defendant in the car with
Kuehne except Vaughn Humpherys, and Humpherys' testimony concerned only the defendant,
Kuehne and Humpherys returning from a deer hunt,
and had nothing to do with Foster.
(d) In the second paragraph at page 3 of the
Court's opinion, it is stated:
"A witness, LaMar B. Williams, who was at the
Susan Kay Arms apartments testified that shortly
after midnight he observed a person, whom he described as resembling Jean Sinclair, and dressed
in clothes similar to those she was wearing, in the
parking area near where Foster was killed, just a
few minutes before it happened. (This the jury
could have accepted as placing the defendant at the
scene of the crime very close to the time it was
committed.)"

Again, this is a conclusion unsupported by the
record. Any fair interpretation of Williams' testimony
other than the extraction of one line leaves no resemblance to the defendant and no similarity of the
clothes other than the person was dressed in pants
and a coat. Kuehne's testimony was that she was
wearing gray flannel pants and a white coat that
came below her knees, (R. 585). Williams' testimony
was a light short coat coming between the knees
and the crotch (R. 981). He could not identify the
tyPe
of <;oat (R. 981)~
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4

In response to the prosecutor's leading question, he· stated that he saw someone in the courtroom that resembled the person. He described a
person with hair on the darker side, wavy in front,
going straight back (R. 980), a man 165 to 180 pounds
(R. 983), having a long nose with a cleft chin and
receding chin line (R. 980). On being confronted by
Miss Sinclair, he admitted she did not have a cleft
chin, a receding chin line or dark hair (R. 982), the
only resemblances claimed. Further, the person was
seen only through a rear view mirror in the dark
(R. 979). The area testified to was not in the parking
lot where Mr. Foster was killed, but almost a block
to the north, with several large apartment buildings
between.
·
(e) The Court sets forth in the third paragraph,
page 3 of the opinion, as follows:
·•Another witness, Boyd K. Harvey, who was driving by at the time, heard a shot and saw a person,
dressed similar to the way defendant was (with a
trench coat on) run from the apartment into 5th
North Street carrying an object extending 18 to 24
inches above he right hand (which could well have
been the sawed-off shotgun), and get into· a twotoned car which drove away. (The defendant owned
a car of this general description.)"

This statement also is unsupported by the record
and seems to be a quotation from page 18 of the
respondent's brief. The only item of apparel described by Harvey was "a three-quarter length coat * * just
above the knees or right at the break of the knees"
(R. 986). A trench coat was not mentioned. Harvey
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described the person as being "very agile" and
"running fast", and as a "burley man about 5' 10"
with dark hair" (R. 988). The statement regarding the
car again is an incomplete excerpt from the respondent's brief, including the portion in parentheses.
Harvey's statement in the record identifies the automobile as a two-tone Chevrolet automobile, without
equivocation (R. 989) with the lighter part on the
bottom (R. 989). The defendant's automobile is a
Buick station wagon and was so described by half
a dozen witnesses.
(f) At paragraph 4 on page 3 of the opinion,
the Court states:
"Two neighbors, a Mr. and Mrs. Pieter Combe·e, who
reside immediately west of the Susan Kay Arms
Apartments, just after the shooting heard the
woman, LaRae Peterson, cry out, 'Oh God, she killed
him'."

and ignores entirely the testimony of two other of
the State's witnesses, John Storey (R. 383): "Help,
he's dead, I know he's dead", and LaRae Peterson
herself (at R. 803): "Oh my God, he's been shot". It
is simple for an advocate to pick excerpts from almost
1700 pages of testimony that appear inculpatory
standing alone but lose any such inference read in
context with the entire record.
It is also interesting to note the Court states that
the Combees live immediately west of the Susan
Kay Arms Apartment, while all the evidence in the
record and the exhibits show the Combees' house to
be directly south of th~ s~~a,:n Kay apartmE?:nt~ apc;t
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also south of the area where Foster parked and was
killed. A small error, surely, but it follows the pattern of repeated failure of the opinion to be supported by the record in a capital case.
(g) The next succeeding paragraph of the
opinion states:
"It was shown that the morning after the killing
the defendant took a three-quarter length trench
coat and some slacks, similar to the clothes she was
wearing that night, which had grease spots and dirt
on them, to a cleaners. (This connects up with the
fact that the defendant had to crawl around cars, and
that there was grease and dirt on her clothing)."

Three persons (all the State's witnesses) testified
as to the coat and trousers brought to the cleaners
with other clothing by Miss Sinclair. It was a coat
that would come a little below the knee. Mr. Allred,
the cleaner, testified that it was a full-length coat as
distinguished from a three-quarter length coat, and
that Miss Sinclair was charged for cleaning a fulllength coat (R. 1002). All three described a tan whipcord coat, while Kuehne's testimony was that the
coat the defendant was wearing was white. The
cleaner described the trousers with spot on as "light
gray pants", while Williams described the trousers
. on the person he saw as "darker trousers" (R. 980,
981), and Harvey as "darker than the jacket or coat
(R. 989).
(h) The next item claimed to be corroborative
in the opinion is the sixth paragraph on page 3:
"There is another fact which may be regarded as
inculpc..tory: That upon questioning, the defendant
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denied ever having been at the Susan Kay Arms
apartments, yet the witness, Gerritadina Combee,
testified that some few days earlier, about Christmas
time, she had seen Jean Sinclair, dressed in men's
clothes, at those apartments in about the same area
as the killing."

Reading the record shows the supposed iden tification by Mrs. Combee was from a right rear view for
only several steps. She never saw the face and could
not describe her clothing or other details (R. 921 ).

POINT II
NO SINGLE ITEM OF EVIDENCE SET FORTH
IN THE OPINION AS CORROBORATIVE WITH THE
EXCEPTION OF KUEHNE'S TESTIMONY, OR IN
COMBINATION OF ANY SUCH INCIDENTS, TENDS
TO CONNECT THE DEFENDANT TO THE HOMICIDE WHEN VIEWED IN THE ABSENCE OF OR
WITHOUT INTERPRETATION FROM KUEHNE'S
TESTIMONY.
Not only does the great weight of case law require that corroborative testimony tend to connect
the defendant to the crime in the absence of and
without interpretation from the testimony of an accomplice, but our statute, 77-31-18, Utah Code Annotated 1953, demands it as is acknowledged by the
Court at the end of page 3 of the opinion.
Applying the test of the statute, "unless he is
corroborated by other evidence which in itself and
witout the aid of the testimony of the accomplice
tends to connect the defendant with the commission
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of the offense'', to each item of the evidence set forth
by the Court in its opinion as being corroborative, it
cannot be said that any one piece of evidence or
any combination, viewed in the absence of Kuehne's
testimony, casts more than a mere suspicion of guilt
or is more consistent with guilt than with innocence.
(a) Mrs. Kuene's statement with respect to making money fast, in the absence of Kuehne's testimony of offers of money by Sinclair, means nothing.
(b) The Court's statement that "She was seen
driving around in a car with him (to pick a point of
vantage to kill Foster);" is not supported by the record in any way.
(c) LaMar B. Williams' testimony, in the absence
of Kuehne's testimony regarding clothing, is without meaning or connection with the defendant. See
Point I, paragraph (d) of this brief.
(d) The witness Harvey's testimony, without
Kuehne's testimony as to the clothing and the
sawed-off shotgun (see Court's ·statement) "(which
could well have been the sawed-off shotgun)", does
not tend to connect the defendant in any way with
the crime. As pointed out in Point I, paragraph (c),
the statement as to a two-toned car is an excerpt
from the record, ignoring the rest of the statement
by Harvey that the car was a Chevrolet. There is no
evidence of the defendant owning or possessing a
Chevrolet automobile. It should be pointed out that
the general description or the person seen by Williams and Harvey, with the exception of a vague simSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ilarity of a light colored coat, described variously,
does not in any way fit the defendant, and the light
coat is without meaning in the absence of Kuehne's
testimony.
(e) The testimony of the two employees at the
cleaners and Officer Paul requires interpretation
from Kuehne's testimony to make any connection
between the defendant and the crime, i.e. the only
testimony as to grease and dust spots comes from
Kuehne and the only testimony as to crawling
around cars was an extrajudicial statement of the
defendant allegedly made to Kuehne.
The statement of Gerritadina Combee identifying the defendant near the scene of the crime
some two weeks prior to the crime is again an excerpt from the record and is not borne out by the
balance of Mrs. Combee's testimony. Also see State
v. Sommers. 97 Utah 132, 90 P.2d 273, holding that
presence in the vicinity of a·crime not at the time of
its commission is not sufficient to corroborate.
(f)

(g) The Court also indicates at pages 2 and 3
of the opinion that there is evidence from witnesses
other than Kuehne "bearing out the facts concerning
defendant's unnatural relationship with LaRae Peterson; that she had such an impassioned attachment
to her and resentment of Foster that she wanted to
resort to fiendish violence to get rid of his rivalry
for her favors". This again is an inference unsupported by the record. All Kuehne's testimony pointed to a concern for the child Cheryl Ann, rather than
an unnatural relationship with LaRae Peterson, and
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10
the State's other witnesses concerning the alleged
attachment brought a direct denial from LaRae Peterson, and State's witness Vaughn Humpherys testified that in all the years he had known them (LaRae
Peterson and Jean Sinclair) he had never seen anything he considered improper between them (R. 750).
His entire testimony was to the effect that the defendant's concern was over the child (R. 719 to 765).
While it is true that LaRae Peterson refused to
answer concerning certain questions as to homosexuality, this Court in reviewing the same facts
held these questions were not relevant. The matter
of the contempt of LaRae Peterson, 386 P.2d 727,
dated November 21, 1963.
It is a simple matter in more than 1600 pages of
record to take statements or phrases out of context
which reflect an indication of guilt or innocence
when not considered with all the evidence. It is our
contention that the examples or incidents set forth
by the Court as being corroborative are not a fair
c~Jnsideration of the testimony.

POINT III
THIS OPINION IF ALLOWED TO STAND AS
WRITTEN WOULD CHANGE THE ENTIRE LAW OF
CORROBORATION OF AN ACCOMPLICE IN THIS
STATE AND WOULD ABROGATE THE PROVISIONS OF 77-31-18, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
1953.
The law is well settled in this State regarding
corroborative evidence both by statute and by case
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11
law, see cases cited at pages 53 and 54 of appellant's
brief in the instant case. The cases over the nation,
almost without exception, hold that the connection
by the evidence in order to make it corroborative
must be "in the absence of and without interpretation from the testimony of an accomplice." The
Court herein cites the statute and then chooses to
ignore the statute. Probably the best example that
can be given is that used by the Court at page '4
concerning a witness seeing X coming from the
woods. It is apparent in the example that there was
corroborative evidence and the facts set forth make
a prima facie case without reference to an accomplice in any way. This cannot be considered an
analogy to the present case. May it be noted that
in the Court's opinion in many of the examples the
Court sets forth in parentheses that the evidence
tends to corroborate with Kuehne's testimony as to
various items, i.e. the offers of money, the clothes
Kuehne says Sinclair was wearing, Kuehne's statement that he sawed off a shotgun; but this is not
the test set forth by either case law in this State or
by statute, the test being that the evidence tends to
connect the defendant to the crime in the absence
of the testimony of the accomplice.
POINT IV
THIS COURT ON NOVEMBER 21, 1963, HELD
THAT QUESTIONS AS TO LESBIAN AND HOMOSEXUALITY AS TO LARAE PETERSON WERE IMMATERIAL,
AND
YETforFAILED
TO
CONSIDER
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HOLDING IN VIEW OF APPELLANT'S POINT XIV
IN HER INITIAL BRIEF.
The Court on November 21, 1963 in the case
of In re Peterson, supra, arising directly from facts
in this case, held that the questions asked LaRae
Peterson with regard to homosexual relations were
not relevant and were not an issue in the case (see
386 P.2d, page 727), yet the Court in its opinion ignores appellant's claim of error in the trial Court's
overruling the appellant's objections to the same
questions as being ambiguous, immaterial and irrelevant. In view of the statements in the opinion
heretofore set forth regarding the unnatural relationship between Peterson and Sinclair, Sinclair's
"violent animus" and desire to resort to "fiendish.
violence", it can hardly be said that allowing such
questions, even without answer, or more cogently,
expressly without answer, was not highly prejudicial to the defendant.
POINT V
THE COURT IGNORED AS WITHOUT MERIT
SEVERAL POINTS OF APPELLANT'S BRIEF WHICH
ARE DIRECTLY SUPPORTED BY CASE LAW FROM
THIS COURT.
(a) The Court brushed off some thirteen points
of the defendant's as being without merit and without discussion thereof. Among these were several
jury incidents ,including the shaking hands and conversation between witness Gerritadina Combee and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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jury foreman Firmage which is so on all fours with

the Utah case of State v. Crank, 142 P.2d 178, that it
is difficult to see how it can be ignored. In addition
thereto, the Court's refusal to allow an examination
into Kuehne's psychiatric background in view of his
relationship to the trial seems to be against the great
weight of authority as to the scope of credibility in
cross examination.

SUMMARY
It is respectfully submitted that, in view of the
matters above set forth which we feel are completely supported by the record and especially in view
of the sensational nature of the case and the fact
that the case is a capital crime, the defendant should
be granted a rehearing.

Respectfully submitted,

SUMNER J. HATCH
Attorney for Appellant
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